More expensive flotsam

As I’ve discussed in a previous post, the US has developed something of a habit for embarking on wasteful military development projects. And how the mantra of “support the troops” is frequently used as an excuse to squander vast sums of money, often with more than a hint of corruption behind these money burning parties . And we will now look at yet another example, the Littoral Combat Ship…..or as some have started to call it “the grift that keeps on giving ” . Or, as another commentator put it “a beautiful disaster”.

Firstly, some background. The advent of stealth technology has lead to stealth ships. However the thing to understand about stealth is it doesn’t render an object “invisible” to radar, it merely reduces the radar signature (“low observable” technology would be a more technically accurate description). This means, the smaller that object is to begin with, the more effective stealth technology will be. Hence a small stealth ship, say the size of a corvette, is going to benefit from this technology a lot more than a larger vessel (such as a destroyer or an aircraft carrier). Meaning it will be able to get a lot closer to the enemy without being detected. Plus a smaller draft means it can operate in shallower waters, the so called Littoral zone (an important consideration in areas such as the Persian gulf, the Baltic or the South China Sea).

The second major development over the last few decades has been the deployment of increasingly accurate and effective anti-ship missiles (which can be shore based or mounted on high speed missile boats). As the recent loss of the Moskva shows, even nations with a fairly moderate level of technology (and virtually no major navy!) have been able to develop some pretty capable anti-ship systems. In theory a smaller vessel could not only counter such threats, but will be less likely to be detected (and thus targeted) and could also mount such weapons itself. And in some combat roles, it might make more sense to spread your firepower out across several smaller vessels rather than relying on a single large vessel.

This doesn’t mean that larger warships are obsolete. Its just that in certain roles, notably coastal defence, ASW (anti-sub warfare) or mine warfare, a fleet of small stealthy warships could make a lot more sense than a few larger destroyers. And several navies have shown that this is a viable strategy. For example, the Norwegian navy has developed the Skjold class (above), while the Swedish navy has had the Visby class (below) in service since the 2000’s. So the LCS was intended to be America’s answer to this.

However (and this where things things start to go off the rails) the US navy couldn’t just settle for something as simple as a stealth corvette (if it was that simple how can the contractor justify their outrageous fees?). No instead they wanted a ship which was modular, so it could incorporate different weapon systems depending on the circumstances (e.g. it could function as a minesweeper, with one set of modular weapons, or ASW with another, etc.). And, with a combination of automation and electronic inventory control, they also wanted to cut down on crew numbers. If the electronics were able to monitor the status of different systems, this would allow data to be relayed back to the manufacturer who could schedule maintenance and ship out parts, so the warship could be repaired (by the contractor rather than the crew) the next time it came into port. Which in theory would also allow for the ships to spend less time down for repairs, meaning a smaller number could cover more sea space. So this project ticked numerous boxes for congress. Two variants were ordered, the Freedom class (left) and the Independence class (right).

The problem was, this was a flawed idea from the start. Many of these different roles place very specific design requirements on a ship. For example a mine counter-measures vessel (MCMV, noting there is a difference between mine sweeping and mine hunting) will want as small an acoustic and metallic footprint as possible (so it can get close to mines without setting them off). For these reasons, most navies build their MCMV’s out of fibreglass and/or use catamaran designs. By contrast, a ASW vessel needs to be much bigger, as it will need to carry a towed sonar array as well as a suite of weapons with which to engage a sub (torpedoes, Depth charges/Depth mortars, ASROC). A helicopter deck would also be desired (as this increases the sea area it can cover). And it needs to be sufficiently fast to chase down any sub it finds.

Well it will come as little surprise to learn that this mission module concept has proven to be problematic, with many such systems repeatedly failing tests, notably as regards the towed sonar array. And putting more weapon systems on a ship means you need more crew. The assumption of the navy was that they could swap systems and personnel out between missions. But this ignores how warfare works. E.g. you suspect there’s an enemy sub in your waters. So your LCS has to go back to port, gets kitted out for ASW work, swaps over crew and then heads out to look for the sub. By which time you realise the sub has left the area, but its laid a minefield in its wake as a parting gift. So you have to head back to port and reconfigure as a minesweeper.

It would make far more sense to simply build ships from the ground up for a particular role and train the crew as appropriate for that role. The aforementioned Nordic vessels work largely because they have specialist roles. The Skjold is very much a fast attack craft, designed to dash out of Fjords, launch what amounts to the naval equivalent of a drive-by shooting at any passing Russians, and be back in port for Aquavit and stockfish before they know what hit them. The Visby leans more towards the ASW role (although it also carries anti-ship weapons too). Both navies already have a dedicated fleet of MCMV’s to handle that role (both classes of ships have some anti-mine capability, but this is largely limited to self defence against mines) and both will generally be operating sufficiently close to shore that they’ll have air cover from their respective air forces if needed.

Given that there are two classes of LCS it would have been all to easy to design one from the ground up as a MCMV and the other as an ASW corvette (some of the latter being configured perhaps for anti-ship strike). But the US navy’s unwillingness to compromise meant they’ve ended up with two very expensive classes of ships (which cost about 4 times more than either of the Nordic vessels to build) which aren’t very good at anything. And it also means crews are being forced to take on longer shifts, as there isn’t enough room on board to accommodate a larger crew. Its worth noting that crew fatigue probably played a role in the loss of the Moskva.

And then there’s this issue of maintenance. If you’ve ever talked to a sailor, you will know that they spend an awful of their time on ship just fixing things or doing routine maintenance. Because in a pitching sea, filled with salt spray, things tend to break if they don’t get a regular dose of spit and polish. The end result of ignoring this fact is that the LCS’s have been wearing out remarkably fast. Some have been decommissioned after as little as 10 years service.

Plus letting the contractor decide when to do maintenance doesn’t exactly sound like a great idea. We’ve all had the experience where you go to a garage and they suggest a bunch of expensive repairs you suspect aren’t entirely necessary. I recall once I got estimates ranging from £750 to £250 for the same repair. And the higher the quote doesn’t mean they’ll do a better job (often times it indicates they don’t know what they are doing). Now imagine you gave that same dodgy garage the exclusive right to repair your car and charge whatever they liked for it. Well obviously they’ll charge an arm and a leg. The annual running costs of an LCS is about $80m per year (against $54m for a regular frigate). Not far off what some navy’s will spend buying a brand new corvette with similar capabilities (imagine having to spend as much each year running a small car as it would cost to buy a new one).

Now, having wasted tens of billions in taxpayer’s money, one of the two classes (Freedom class) is essentially being cancelled. Officially this is due to an issue with the combining gear, but this is likely just an excuse to cancel the programme (its quite common to see embarrassing projects cancelled due to some minor technical issue just to save face). Interestingly, a hull cracking problem has emerged with the Independence class ships, so they could be on the chopping block too.

Instead the US navy is going back to more conventional frigate designs. Or in other words, the US navy is going backwards in terms of ship design. Oh….and they are still building LCS’s, even thought they seem intent on cancelling the whole programme (well how else are the defence contractors going to pay for that new Ferrari!).

The reason for this mess, much like the Zummalt class, the F-35 or the KC-X, or numerous other money burning parties is often the same. The Pentagon sets its sights on something that’s impractical and insanely expensive. Congress not only doesn’t stop them, but make things worse, by for example insisting ships be built in Wisconsin…..hundreds of miles from any coastline! (just so some congressmen could let some juiced in locals get contracts and collect kickbacks). And corrupt military contractors, more interested in fleecing taxpayers than building hardware to help defend their country, proceed to make a pigs ear of the whole project. After all, its not like they’ll be punished for that or anything. Plus the more money they waste, the more they get to skim off the top.

And the cycle just keeps repeating itself. And its not just military contracts either. The California high speed railway project is failing, largely for political reasons. So when we say America these days is going backwards, a failing empire, it is important to realise its being hollowed out from within. Putin has a lot to answer for, but he’s not been in charge of the US defence budget for the last few decades.